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Evolutionary game theory typically focuses on actions but ignores
motives. Here, we introduce a model that takes into account the
motive behind the action. A crucial question is why do we trust
people more who cooperate without calculating the costs? We
propose a game theory model to explain this phenomenon. One
player has the option to “look” at the costs of cooperation, and the
other player chooses whether to continue the interaction. If it is
occasionally very costly for player 1 to cooperate, but defection is
harmful forplayer 2,then cooperationwithoutlooking is a subgame
perfect equilibrium. This behavior also emerges in population-based
processes of learning or evolution. Our theory illuminates a number
of key phenomena of human interactions: authentic altruism, why
people cooperate intuitively, one-shot cooperation, why friends do
not keep track of favors, why we admire principled people, Kant’s
second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, taboos, and love.
game theory | evolution | emotion | motive | cooperation
C
ooperation occurs when we take on costs to help others. A key
mechanism by which cooperation is sustained is reciprocity:
Individuals cooperate with those who have cooperated in the past
(1–14).However,wecareaboutnotonlywhetherotherscooperate,
but, also, their decision-making process: we place more trust in
cooperators who do not strategically weigh the costs and make an
effort to collect them before deciding whether to cooperate. For
example, we are impressed by colleagues who immediately agree
to proofread a paper but view with suspicion those who ask,
“how many pages does it have?” Intuitively, those who cooperate
without“looking”(CWOL)canbetrustedtocooperateevenintimes
when there are large temptations to defect. However, willthe added
trust from CWOL be worth missing out on those large temptations?
Additionally, which conditions make CWOL a winning strategy?
To address these questions, we develop the envelope game (Fig.
1), which is a repeated asymmetric game between two players. In
each round, player 1 receives an envelope, which contains the
magnitude of the temptation to defect. The temptation is low with
probability p and high with probability 1−p. Player 1 can choose
to look inside the envelope and, thus, find out the magnitude of the
temptation. Then, player 1 decides to cooperate or defect. Sub-
sequently, player 2 can either continue or end the game. In the
former case, there is another round with probability w.
If player 1 cooperates, her payoff is a, whereas player 2 receives
b. If player 1 defects, her payoff is either cl or ch,d e p e n d i n go n
whether the temptation is low or high, respectively, whereas player
2 receives d. We have the following inequalities: ch >cl >a>0a n d
b>0>d. Moreover, we have pb+ð1−pÞd<0. Therefore, player 2
prefers not to interact with a player 1 who only cooperates when
the temptation is low. Finally, we assume that low temptation is
more likely than high temptation: p>1=2.
To understand the essence of the game, we need to consider
four strategies for player 1 and three strategies for player 2. The
player 1 strategies are (i) CWOL, (ii) cooperate with looking
(CWL), (iii) look and cooperate only when the temptation is low,
and (iv) always defect. The player 2 strategies are (i) end if player
1 looks, (ii) end if player 1 defects, and (iii) always end. In SI
Appendix, we also explore a richer strategy set.
The payoff matrix is shown in Table 1. The strategy pair “always
defect” and “always end” ( A L L D )i sa l w a y saN a s he q u i l i b r i u m ;n o
player can increase her payoff by deviating unilaterally. However,
there are other Nash equilibria. All proofs are in SI Appendix.
Of particular interest is the strategy pair where player 1 chooses
CWOLandplayer2endsthegameifplayer1looks.Thisstrategypair
isaNashequilibriumifa=ð1−wÞ≥clp+chð1−pÞ.Thisconditionhas
a natural interpretation: player 1’s expected temptation from de-
fection is less than the gains from an ongoing cooperative in-
teraction. The expected temptation matters because, if player 1
were to look, player 2 would end the relationship. Thus, player 1
might as well defect, regardless of the temptation. Not looking, in
a sense, smooths the temptation to defect; the variability in
temptations no longer matters.
Another relevant strategy pair is if player 1 CWL and player 2
ends if player 1 defects. This pair is a Nash equilibrium if
a=ð1−wÞ≥ch. This condition has the following interpretation: to
sustain CWL, the long-term gains to player 1 from the ongoing
relationship mustsufficeforplayer1to cooperate, evenifplayer 1
knows the temptation is high in the current period. For CWL, it is
the maximal temptation that matters; because player 1 is not pe-
nalized for looking, she can look at the temptation and choose to
defect only if it is high.
When it is occasionally very costly to cooperate [clp+chð1−pÞ≤
a=ð1−wÞ<ch], CWL is not an equilibrium, but CWOL is. This
expression identifies the region where we should be most likely
to discover CWOL. In SI Appendix, we show that the inequality
pb+ ð1−pÞd<0 must hold for CWOL to emerge.
In SI Appendix, we also address some concerns. First, after we
consider a richer strategy set, there might be other equilibria of
the envelope game, in which player 1 sometimes does not look.
These equilibria might exist under different conditions from
those given above, which may draw into question our statement
that looking matters under these conditions. We show that, when
we rule out strategies that randomize or depend on the round,
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SALLD, CWOL, and CWL are the only equilibria of the envelope
game, even with this richer strategy set.
Second, because player 2 does not directly benefit by attending
to looking, she might not do so. This concern proves moot. The
intuition is that, if there is even a small probability that player 1
looks, player 2 is better off attending to looking. We formalize
this intuition by showing that this equilibrium, as well as ALLD
and CWL, can be made subgame-perfect, which is a solution
concept used to rule out these kinds of concerns (15).
In many cases, we do not consciously avoid looking or distrust
those who look, but, rather, are guided to do so by a gut sense, an
emotion, or an ideology. That is, looking “feels” or “is” wrong.
Where do these emotions and ideologies come from? Individuals
do not adopt them rationally or even consciously. Therefore, we
now consider the case where strategies (such as, it feels wrong to
look) are learned or evolved.
We use the replicator dynamic, which is the standard model
for evolutionary dynamics (16–18), and also described rein-
forcement learning and prestige-biased imitation (19). The rate
of reproduction is proportional to the payoff that a strategy
receives. Because we have two types of players, our simulation
studies coevolutionary dynamics in two populations. Players of
type 1 can adopt one of four strategies described above. Players
of type 2 can adopt one of three strategies described above. Our
state space is the product of the simplex S4 and the simplex S3.A
point in the simplex S4 describes a strategy mix of type 1 players. A
point in the simplex S3 describes a strategy mix of type 2 players.
We randomly seed the strategy frequencies many times and re-
cord the frequency of each strategy after the population has sta-
bilized. We observe three possible outcomes that correspond to the
Nash equilibria described above (Fig. 2). (i) Type 1 players con-
verge to always defect, whereas type 2 players converge to a tri-
angular region close to always end. (ii)T y p e1p l a y e r sc o n v e r g et o
CWOL, whereas type 2 players converge to a mixture between end
if player 1 looks and end if player 1 defects. For stability, this mix-
ture must contain a minimum fraction of end if player 1 looks. (iii)
Type 1 players converge to a mixture between CWOL and CWL,
whereas type 2 players converge to end if player 1 defects. The
dynamicstabilityofthoseevolutionaryoutcomescoincideswiththe
criteria for the underlying strategy pairs to be Nash equilibria.
We now apply the model to shed light on some questions di-
rectly related to cooperation.
First, psychologists and philosophers have long asked the

















Fig. 1. The envelope game. (1) The game begins when the temptation to defect is randomly chosen, as indicated by a notice being placed in the envelope.
The temptation to defect is low with probability p and high with probability 1−p. (2) Player 1 receives the envelope and chooses whether to look (open the
envelope). (3) Player 1 decides whether to cooperate or defect. Player 1 can only condition her action on the realized temptation if she has looked. Each time
that player 1 cooperates, regardless of whether player 1 looked, both players benefit from the interaction: player 1 gets a>0, and player 2 gets b>0. Player 1
gains even more if she defects. If the temptation is low, player 1 gets cl >a, and if it is high, player 1 gets ch >cl. In either case, each time that player 1 defects,
player 2 is harmed and gets a negative payoff (d <0). Moreover, we assume that the harm is substantial [d <−bp=ð1−pÞ], and therefore, player 2 prefers not
to interact with a player 1 who only cooperates when the temptation is low. (4) Player 2, having observed both of player 1’s choices, decides whether to
continue or end. If player 2 continues, there is another round with probability w.
Table 1. Payoffs for a restricted set of strategies in the envelope game
Player 1
Player 2











Look and cooperate only






Always defect clp+chð1−pÞ,dc lp+chð1−pÞ,dc lp+chð1−pÞ,d
†
Player 1’s strategies are presented in rows, and player 2’s strategies are presented in columns. The payoffs at the intersection of a given row and column
are those that the players receive if they play the corresponding strategies. For example, if player 1 looks and cooperates only if the temptation is lowa n d
player 2 ends if player 1 defects, then player 1’s expected payoff is ½ap+chð1−pÞ =½1−pw , and player 2’s expected payoff is ½bp+dð1−pÞ =½1−pw . Details of
calculations leading to payoffs are in SI Appendix. Depending on the parameter values, there are up to three Nash equilibria. The pair (ALLD) is always a Nash
equilibrium. The pair (CWOL and end if player 1 looks) is a Nash equilibrium if a=ð1−wÞ>clp+chð1−pÞ. The pair (CWL and end if player 1 defects) is a Nash
equilibrium if a=ð1−wÞ>ch. We refer to these strategy pairs as ALLD, CWOL, and CWL, respectively.
†Nash equilibria of the envelope game.
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subtle” (20) [for example, the conscious anticipation of feeling
good (21), avoidance of guilt (22–24), reputational benefits, or
reciprocity (1–14)]. At the extreme, this question amounts to ask-
ing if saintly individuals, such as Gandhi or Mother Teresa, were
motivated thus or if they were authentic altruists who did good
without anticipating any reward and would be altruistic, even in
the absence of such rewards. Our model suggests that authentic
altruism is, indeed, possible: by focusing entirely on the benefits to
others, authentic altruists are trusted more, and the benefits from
this trust outweigh the risk of, for example, dying a martyr’s death.
Second, we address another question of why people are intuitive
cooperators. That is, when people decide rapidly, they are more
likely to cooperate than if they have time to deliberate. Addition-
ally, people who cooperate decide more quickly than those who
defect (25–27). Intuitive cooperation underlies extreme acts of
heroism, acts which, because they place the hero at great personal
risk, are otherwise difficult to explain (28). The Social Heuristics
Hypothesis offers one explanation for this phenomenon: we adopt
heuristics to avoid incurring cognitive costs associated with de-
liberation (29–31). In a world with repeated interactions, it is
usually worthwhile to cooperate, and therefore, individuals may
adopt heuristics, such as always cooperate or always cooperate in
nonbusiness settings. These same individuals, when serving as
laboratory subjects, may apply these heuristics and cooperate even
when it is not worthwhile to do so (25, 32, 33).
Our model offers an additional explanation for intuitive co-
operation: intuitive cooperation may serve to reduce respon-
siveness to costs of cooperating in a particular situation. For this
explanation to be sensible, it must be the case that whether
a decision is made intuitively or deliberately is detectable. In
fact, it is: deliberative decision-making leads to slower reaction
time as well as increased pupil size and heart rate (34) and
sometimes, blushing or stammering (35). Our model makes two
predictions that one would not make if the Social Heuristics
Hypothesis, by itself, explained intuitive cooperation: decisions
related to cooperation are more likely to be intuitive than other




























































[pcl + (1-p)ch](1-w) ch(1-w)
Payoff a
Fig. 2. Learning dynamics of the envelope game. We randomly seed the strategy frequencies 10,000 times for 50 values of the payoff value a and record the
frequency of each strategy after 1,000 generations. We observe three possible outcomes that correspond to the Nash equilibria identified in Table 1. (i)T y p e1
players converge to always defect, whereas type 2 players converge to a triangular region close to always end. (ii) Type 1 players converge to CWOL, whereas
type 2 players converge to a mixture between end if player 1 looks and end if player 1 defects. For stability, this mixture must contain a minimum fractiono f
end if player 1 looks. (iii) Type 1 players converge to a mixture between CWOL and CWL, whereas type 2 players converge to end if player 1 defects. We vary
the value of a along the x axis. The y axis represents frequencies, and each colored line presents the frequency of each outcome. The parameter region where
the corresponding strategy pair is supported as an equilibrium is shaded. Additional details are in SI Appendix. All D, all defect; C, cooperate.

































Scooperators are trusted more than reflective cooperators. There
is evidence for the latter: in an experiment eliciting moral
judgments, subjects who read vignettes about people who re-
turned lost wallets judged those who returned the wallets without
hesitation more positively than those who hesitated (36).
Third, we address the question of why people cooperate in one-
shot situations (for example, in laboratory experiments, such as the
dictator game) (37). Cooperation in these situations is puzzling from
the standpoint of models of the evolution of cooperation based on
reciprocity, because in that framework, cooperation can only im-
prove one’s reputation if actions are observed, and reputations are
only valuable if others have an opportunity to reciprocate. Some
have suggested that cooperation in these settings results from
intuitive cooperation (25, 32), that it can emerge if there is un-
certainty over the probability of future cooperation opportunities
(38), or that it is a consequence of the evolution of altruism
caused by group selection (37). We offer another potential ex-
planation by considering a variation of our model, in which the
likelihood of continuation varies and player 1 learns this likeli-
hood when she looks (details in SI Appendix). This model sug-
gests that subjects learned or evolved to not consider who is
watching so that others can expect them to cooperate, even when
no one is. Unlike the other explanations cited, our explanation
implies that, when there ends up being an opportunity to interact
again, those who cooperate when they thought no one could
reciprocate will be rewarded more than those who cooperated
knowing someone could reciprocate. Indeed, laboratory subjects
cooperate more with those who cooperated with a third party
under the presumption that no one would have a chance to re-
ciprocate (39). Moreover, our explanation uniquely predicts that
people would feel wrong attending because of the fact that the
situation is one shot and that others will judge them harshly if
they behave differently when the situation is one shot.
Fourth, we address the question of why we find it unbecoming
when close friends keep track of favors or reciprocate favors im-
mediately. In experiments, subjects (i) do not cooperate more with
friends who have just given them a gift but do cooperate more with
strangers who have just given them the same gift (40), (ii)t a k e
greater care to highlight contributions to strangers than to friends
(41), (iii) are offended when close friends immediately reciprocate
kind acts but not when strangers do (42), and (iv) judge friendships
as less close when those relationships display immediate reciprocity
(43, 44). In fact, relationships have been shown to fall into distinct
categories, in part characterized by whether favors are tracked (45).
These observations have led researchers to conclude that “the
dynamic of friendship does not fit the logic of models of reciprocity
and presents a puzzle for evolutionary analysis” (43). However, our
model suggests an explanation that is consistent with reciprocity. If
close friends CWOL, their decision to cooperate is affected not by
a single, recent kind act but, rather, only by the distribution of
payoffs from the relationship in the long run. Moreover, when the
beneficiary of a good deed immediately reciprocates, then either
the beneficiary is looking or the beneficiary thinks that the friend
w h od i dt h eg o o dd e e dw a sl o o k i n g .
Fifth, our model gives insight on a number of interesting
phenomena not prima facie related to cooperation.
Why do we like people who are principled and not like those
who are strategic? For example, we trust candidates for political
office whose policies are the result of their convictions and
consistent over time, and we distrust those whose policies are
carefully constructed in consultation with their pollsters and who
flip-flop in response to public opinion (as caricatured by the
infamous 2004 Republican presidential campaign television ad-
vertisement showing John Kerry windsurfing and tacking from
one direction to the other). Instead of respecting politicians who
flexibly respond to public opinion, we view them as sleazy.
Our model offers the following potential explanation. Someone
who is strategic considers the costs and benefits to themselves of
every decision and will defect when faced with a large temptation,
whereas someone who is guided by principles is less sensitive to
the costs and benefits to themselves and, thus, less likely to defect.
Imagine that our flip-flopping politician was once against gay
marriage but supports it now that it is popular. That he only
supports it when it is popular indicates that the politician is un-
likely to fight for the cause if it later becomes unpopular with
constituents or risks losing a big donor. Note that, not only will gay
rights activists distrust the flip-flopper but also, women’s rights
activists will distrust him, even if the flip-flopping politician has
always supported women’s rights, because the flip-flopper would
be likely to end his support for women’si s s u e si fi ti se v e ra d -
vantageous for him to do so. Of course, we do want our politicians
to be strategic about some things. For example, we would prefer
that they carefully consider fatalities before invading a foreign
country. Our model suggests that we would like politicians—and
others more generally—to be strategic about the costs and benefits
to us (fatalities) but not the costs and benefits to themselves
(likelihood of getting reelected).
Our model also teaches us when we will not be bothered if others
are strategic: when defections are either not especially tempting,
a=ð1−wÞ>ch, or not especially harmful, bp+dð1−pÞ>0. Contrast
the flip-flopping politician with a business partner who might have
the opportunity to cut you out of your latest deal. As long as such
a temptation benefits your partner little relative to losing a valuable
long-term partnership, your partner would never be tempted, and
you need not be bothered if he is strategic.
Next, we discuss why we feel moral disgust by those who use or
manipulate others, as famously condemned by Kant in his second
formulation of the Categorical Imperative: “Act in such a way
that you treat humanity ...never merely as a means to an end,
but always at the same time as an end” (46). Consider the well-
known example of dwarf-tossing. Many see it as a violation of
dwarves’ basic dignity to use them as a means for amusement,
although dwarves willingly engage in the activity for economic
gain. Our aversion to using people may explain many important
aspects of our moral intuitions, such as why we judge torture as
worse than imprisonment or punishment. Our model suggests
that we are repulsed by those who treat others as a means to an
end, because they are liable to mistreat their relationship part-
ners when expedient, even if, currently, the relationship is
mutually beneficial.
The previous two applications are examples of a more general
phenomenon: that we judge the moral worth of an action based
on the motivation of the actor as argued by deontological ethi-
cists but contested by consequentialists. The deontological ar-
gument is famously invoked by Kant (46):
Action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be
attained by it but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided
upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the
object of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in ac-
cordance with which the action is done without regard for any object
of the faculty of desire.
These applications illustrate that we attend to motives because
they provide valuable information on whether the actor can be
trusted to treat others well, even when it is not in her interest.
Next, we consider why people dislike considering tradeoffs
related to “sacred values” (47). Sacred values are values, such as
love, liberty, honor, justice, or life, that people treat “as pos-
sessing transcendental significance that precludes comparisons,
tradeoffs, or indeed any mingling with secular values” (47). Al-
though there is variation in what societies consider sacred, vir-
tually all societies have a concept of sacredness (47). Sacred
values are so strongly imbued in us that we do not find them
puzzling prima fascia, but their existence and origin remain
poorly understood. What makes us treat some values as sacred,
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time or money, that we more readily trade?
Our model provides one possible explanation. People who
calculate costs of trading off against sacred values are less
trustworthy when it comes to safeguarding these values than
people who consider them sacred and would never calculate the
costs of trading off against them. Responding with disgust to
these taboo tradeoffs may be one way to prevent us from inter-
acting with people who make such tradeoffs and, hence, are less
trustworthy and, also, may be a way to signal to others that we
ourselves would not consider and, therefore, make such trade-
offs. Consistent with CWOL, it is taboo to consider the tradeoff,
even if one ultimately makes the right choice, and the longer the
tradeoff is considered for, the harsher the judgment by observers
(47). Importantly, those who consider a taboo tradeoff, such as
selling their own child, pay a reputational cost, because such
considerations indicate that one, in general, does not hold sacred
values and cannot be trusted with, for example, care of others’
children, the elderly, or shared resources.
If CWOL, indeed, underlies the phenomenon of taboo tradeoffs,
then it provides two predictions. First, taboo tradeoffs will prevail
precisely in situations where there is large but infrequent temptation
to defect and defection is harmful, such as selling a child, betraying
a country, or sleeping with someone for a million dollars. It remains
to be shown that taboo tradeoffs show these characteristics. Second,
it also provides an important policy prescription regarding policies
forbidding taboo tradeoffs (for example, the ban on euthanasia):
such policies are socially suboptimal, because the benefits of
cooperating without looking accrue to the individuals who advocate
them, but the costs are borne by society. We note that the above
arguments extend to taboos in general and explain why they often
have the property that it is not merely a transgression to violate the
taboo but to just consider violating it (48).
Finally, our model offers an explanation for emotions, such as
love, which is closely related to the explanation first proffered by
Frank (49) [precursory insight is given in the work by Schelling
(50); also see the works by Hirshleifer (51), Pinker (35), and
Winters (52)]. Love has the property that we behave altruistically
toward our partners, regardless of what temptations arise (49), as
illustrated by the wedding vow “for better or for worse, for
richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health.” For example, love
causes individuals to ignore other potential mates, even if those
mates are better than one’s current mate, as Shakespeare’s Juliet
did when her love for Romeo led her to rebuff the advances of
the otherwise more suitable Paris.
Why does love have this property? Our model suggests that
those who are blinded by love can be trusted to stay with their
partners in sickness and health, because they are not looking at
the costs of cooperation in these diverse situations. This expla-
nation for love is different from the explanation by Frank (49).
Frank (49) argues that those who are blinded by love observably
commit to staying with their partners. That is, those who are in
love today do not have the option to defect tomorrow. The ar-
gument by Frank (49) has been criticized because one could
evolve to be in love today and defect tomorrow. Our model
requires a different and, we think, more realistic constraint: that
it is impossible to look while one appears as though not looking.
This assumption is justified by the fact that, at least in some
contexts, gathering information about the costs and benefits is
inherently observable (for example, through reaction time or the
questions that one asks).
Existing evidence is consistent with both models: emotions
related to love are observable (53), cannot be faked (54), and are
relied on by partners when choosing whether to cooperate (55,
56). There is also reason to believe that love and related emo-
tions would be hard to fake given their autonomic origins and the
costs of placing their activation under conscious control (35, 49).
It remains to be shown that love, in particular, has these attrib-
utes and that we cannot evolve or learn to display love while still
attending to costs. Thus, additional research is warranted to
differentiate between the model by Frank (49) and CWOL.
Consistent with CWOL, mere discussions of the costs and
benefits of a relationship or a breakup (for example, suggesting
a prenuptial agreement) damage the relationship. Such dis-
cussions indicate that one is looking at the costs of the re-
lationship and cast doubt on one’s commitment. CWOL also
elucidates that falling in or out of love depends on the distribu-
tion of temptations but not their immediate realizations, sug-
gesting that people will fall out of love when there is a permanent
change in alternative mating opportunities or relationship costs
but not when there is a one-off temptation. For example, one may
fall out of love with one’s partner after becoming unexpectedly
successful. Finally, CWOL clarifies that love comes with a cost—
the cost of ignored temptations—and suggests that this cost must
be compensated for with commensurate investment in the re-
lationship. Only sometimes is it worthwhile for the recipient of
love to compensate a suitor, which explains why people actively
avoid the strong affections of those with whom they do not wish
to have long-term relationships.
These arguments extend to anger. Anger can be thought of as
“punishing without looking.” It prevents people from looking at
the costs of inflicting harm on others after a transgression,
thereby deterring future transgressions.
This paper formalizes a simple intuition first spelled out by
Trivers (1):
One can imagine, for example, compensating for a misdeed without
any emotional basis but with a calculating, self-serving motive. Such
an individual should be distrusted because the calculating spirit that
leads this subtle cheater now to compensate may in the future lead
him to cheat when circumstances seem more advantageous (because
of unlikelihood of detection, for example, or because the cheated
individual is unlikely to survive).
We hope that formalizing this intuition has added valuable in-
sight on otherwise puzzling aspects of human nature.
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